Then, through what He gives him a choice in within this scope called supererogatory action, He grants him the ruling of divine choice[34] in “if He wishes, and if He wishes,” clothing him in His robe.
The servant is indeed more entitled to the attribute of choice than that of constraint, for he truly has alternation because of his possibility, while the Real does not. When the like of this appears from the Real, know that the Real has appeared in a possible being’s form.
Hence we observe courtesy by saying that one should not say of God that He may do such-and-such or may not do it. We say that this possible being may be or may not be.
Likewise, when constraint appears from the servant, it appears from him only through a form of Real, not through himself. He is a servant only by observing his master’s prescriptions, being originally stripped of action. He must therefore appear through a form of Real when he appears through his servanthood, which is performing the action he has been charged with.
(The Servant, the Thing, and the Ruling of Obligation and Supererogatory Action)
Hence the Real did not say that He is a thing’s He-ness, but that He is the servant’s He-ness. We thus know that the servant’s ruling is not the thing’s ruling.
The ruling of supererogatory action is more fitting for the servant, were it not for its scents of lordship. The ruling of obligation is more fitting for the Lord, were it not for its scents of servanthood.
Let each ruling be placed in the setting where God placed it, so that God is the one placing, not we. We then become free and safe from objection when God questions us.
(The Love of Honor and the Forgiveness of Sins)
Notes
[34]
(The previous version read “testing.” It was corrected to “choice” by comparison with the new edition, volume 10, page 437.)
