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Yazma cildi 1 · Sayfa 150

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Arapça kaynağı açİngilizce çeviriyi aç

Arapça

التَّثنِيَة من أجل المتعلَّقِ الَّذي هو المسموع والمبصَر (الَّذي يُعلم بهٰذين الطَّريقين).

مسألة (30) (الأزل)

الأَزَلُ نَعْتٌ سلبيٌّ وهو نفيُ الأوَّليَّةِ، فإذا قُلنا أوَّلٌ في حقِّ الأُلوهة فَلَيسَ إلا المرتبةُ.[194]

مسألة (31) (الحدوث)

دلَّت الأشاعرة على حُدوث كلِّ ما سوى الله بحُدوثِ المُتحيِّزاتِ وحُدوث أعراضِها، وهٰذا لا يصحُّ حتى يقيموا الدَّليل على حَصرِ كلِّ ما سِوى الله تعالى فيما ذكروه، ونحن نُسلِّمُ حُدوثَ ما ذكروا حُدوثه (ولكن هناك مخلوقات غير متحيّزة ولا هي أعرَاضٌ قائمة في متحيِّز، وذٰلك مثال الجوهر الفرد القائم بنفسه).

مسألة (32) (التَّحيُّز)

كلُّ موجودٍ قائمٌ بنفسهِ غيْرُ مُتَحَيِّزٍ، وهو ممكنٌ لا تجري مع وجوده الأزمنة ولا تطلُبُه الأمكنة.

مسألة (33) (المُمكن الأوّل)

دلالة الأشعريِّ في المُمكنِ الأوَّل أنَّه يجوز تقدُّمُه على زمانِ وجودِه وتأخُّره عنه -والزَّمان عنده في هذه المسألة مقدَّرٌ لا موجودٌ- فالاختصاص دليلٌ على المخصِّصِ، فهذه دلالةٌ فاسدةٌ لعَدَمِ الزَّمَانِ،[195] فبطل أن يكون هٰذا دليلاً.

فلو قالَ (الأشعري): نسبةُ المُمكنات إلى الوُجود أو نسبةُ الوُجود إلى المُمكنات نسبةٌ واحدةٌ من حيث ما هي نسبةٌ لا من حيث ما هو ممكن؛ فاختصاصُ بعضِ المُمكناتِ بالوُجودِ دُونَ غيره من المُمكناتِ دليلٌ على أنَّ لها

Notlar

[194]

راجع تحليلنا لمفهوم ابن العربي للأزل في الفصل الثاني من كتاب نظريّة الجوهر الفرد (ص: ؟؟؟).

[195]

للمزيد حول معنى الزّمان الوجودي والمُقدَّر، راجع الفصل الثاني من كتاب نظريّة الجوهر الفرد (ص: ؟؟؟).

İngilizce

because of the objects of the relation: what is heard and what is seen (known through these two ways).

Question (30): (Beginninglessness)

Beginninglessness is a negative qualification: it negates a first beginning. When we say “First” of Divinity, we mean only rank.[194]

Question (31): (Temporal Origination)

The Asharites argue for the origination of everything other than God from the origination of spatially located things and their accidents. This is not sound until they establish that everything other than God is confined to what they have mentioned. We concede the origination of the things they call originated (but there are created things that are neither spatially located nor accidents subsisting in something spatially located; an example is the self-subsisting Single Monad).

Question (32): (Spatial Location)

Every self-subsisting existent that is not spatially located, and is possible, exists without times running alongside its existence or places laying claim to it.

Question (33): (The First Possible Existent)

The Asharite’s argument concerning the first possible existent is that its existence could precede or follow the time of its existence—in this question he treats time as posited, not existent—so its specification indicates a Specifier. This argument is unsound because time does not exist;[195] it therefore fails as a proof.

Had he said instead: “The relation of possible things to existence, or of existence to possible things, is one relation insofar as it is a relation, not insofar as the thing is possible; thus the specification of some possible things for existence rather than others proves that they have—”

Notlar

[194]

See our analysis of Ibn al-Arabi’s concept of beginninglessness in Chapter Two of Nazariyyat al-Jawhar al-Fard (p. ??? [reference unfinished in the source]).

[195]

On the meaning of existent and posited time, see Chapter Two of Nazariyyat al-Jawhar al-Fard (p. ??? [reference unfinished in the source]).

Translator’s note TN150-1: “Possible” here means that whose existence is not necessary in itself, not merely a hypothetical fiction. The parenthetical reference to the Single Monad is already present in the edited Arabic source.

Yazma görüntüsüYazma cildi 1 · Sayfa 150

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Kahire kaynak referansı

Ibn al-Arabi, The Meccan Revelations — Yazma cildi 1 · Sayfa 150 — https://www.futmak.com/turkce/konya/pages.php?id=150&text=both