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Yazma cildi 1 · Sayfa 144

Konya yazması

Arapça kaynağı açİngilizce çeviriyi aç

Arapça

مسألة (15) (العِلم)

العلمُ ليس تصوُّرَ المعلوم، ولا هو المعنى الَّذي يتصوَّرُ المعلوم؛ فإنَّه ما كُلُّ معلومٍ يُتَصَوَّرُ، ولا كُلِّ عالِمٍ يَتَصَوَّرُ، فإنَّ التَّصَوُّرَ للعالِم إنما هو من كونه متخيِّلاً، والصورة للمعلوم أن تكون على حالة يمسِكُها الخيال، وثَمَّ معلوماتٍ لا يمسِكُها خيالٌ أصلاً؛ فثبت أنها لا صورة لها.

مسألة (16) (قدرة المُمكن)

لو صحَّ الفعلُ من المُمكنِ لصحَّ أن يكونَ قادراً، ولا فِعلَ له فلا قُدرَة له؛ فإثبات القُدرةِ للمُمكن دعوَى بِلا برهان، وكلامنا في هٰذا الفصل مع الأشاعرة المثبِتين لَها (أي للقدرة) مع نفيِ الفعل عنها.

مسألة (17) (لا يصدر عن الواحد من كلّ وجه إلاَّ واحد)

لا يصدر عن الواحد من كلِّ وجهٍ إلا واحد، وهل ثمَّ من هو على هٰذا الوصف أم لا؟ في ذٰلك نظر للمنصف: ألا ترى الأشاعرة ما جعلوا الإيجاد للحقِّ إلاَّ من كونِهِ قادراً، والاختصاصَ من كونِهِ مُريداً، والأَحكامَ من كونِهِ عالِماً؟ وكونُ الشّيْءِ مُريداً ما هو عينُ كونِهِ قادِراً، فليس قولهم بعد هٰذا إنَّه واحدٌ من كلِّ وجهٍ صحيحاً في التَّعلُّقِ العامّ، وكيف وهُم مُثبتو الصِّفَاتِ زائدةً على الذَّات قائمةً به تعالى!

وهكذا القائلون بالنِّسَبِ والإضافات، وكلُّ فرقةٍ من الفِرَقِ ما تخلَّصَتْ لهمُ الوحدةُ

İngilizce

Question (15): (Knowledge)

Knowledge is not forming an image of the known, nor is it the attribute that forms such an image. Not everything known can be imagined, nor does every knower imagine. A knower forms an image only insofar as he possesses imagination; and for the known to possess a form is for it to have a condition that imagination can grasp. There are things known that no imagination can grasp at all. It is therefore established that they have no form.

Question (16): (The Power of the Possible Being)

If action could properly originate from the possible being, it could properly be powerful. But it has no act, and so it has no power. Affirming power for the possible being is a claim without proof. Our discussion in this section is directed to the Asharites, who affirm it (power) while denying that an act proceeds from it.

Question (17): (From What Is One in Every Respect, Only One Proceeds)

From what is one in every respect, only one proceeds. But is there anything that answers this description? This calls for consideration by the fair-minded. Do you not see that the Asharites attribute bringing into existence to the Real only insofar as He is powerful, specification insofar as He wills, and judgments insofar as He knows? Yet a thing’s being willing is not identical with its being powerful. Their subsequent statement that He is one in every respect is therefore not correct concerning His relation to all things. How could it be, when they affirm attributes additional to the Essence, subsisting in Him, exalted is He?

The same applies to those who speak of relations and attributions. No group among the groups has secured unity for itself—

Yazma görüntüsüYazma cildi 1 · Sayfa 144

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Kahire kaynak referansı

Ibn al-Arabi, The Meccan Revelations — Yazma cildi 1 · Sayfa 144 — https://www.futmak.com/turkce/konya/pages.php?id=144&text=both