Manuscript volume 3 · Page 116

في مرتبته بأسمائه الحسنى يسمى منعوتا موصوفا بها،^[30] فعين نسبة الأول له هي عين نسبة الآخر والظاهر والباطن.

لا يقال هو أول بنسبة كذا ولا آخر بنسبة كذا، فإن الممكن مرتبط بواجب الوجود في وجوده وعدمه ارتباط افتقار إليه في وجوده. فإن أوجده لم يزل الممكن في إمكانه، وإن عدم لم يزل عن إمكانه.

فكما لم يدخل على الممكن في وجود عينه بعد أن كان معدوما صفة تزيله عن إمكانه، كذٰلك لم يدخل على الخالق الواجب الوجود في إيجاده العالَم وصف يزيله عن وجوب وجوده لنفسه. فلا يعقل الحق إلا هكذا ولا يعقل الممكن إلّا هكذا،^[31] فإن فهمت علمت معنى الحدوث ومعنى القدم، فقل بعد ذٰلك ما شئت.

(أولية العالم وآخريته والأسماء الإلهية)

فأولية العالَم وآخريته أمر إضافي إن كان له آخر. أما في الوجود فله آخر في كل زمان فرد و(له) انتهاء عند أرباب الكشف، ووافقتهم الحسبانية على ذٰلك، كما وافقتهم الأشاعرة على إن العرض لا يبقى زمانين. فالأول من العالَم هو بالنسبة إلى ما يخلق بعده، والآخر من العالَم هو بالنسبة إلى ما خلق قَبْلُه.

وليس كذٰلك معقولية الاسم الله بالأول والآخر والظاهر والباطن، فإن العالَم يتعدد والحق واحد لا يتعدد. ولا يصح أن يكون أولا لنا، فإن رتبته لا تناسب رتبتنا ولا تقبل رتبتنا أوليته.

in His rank is named by His Most Beautiful Names, characterized and described by them.^[30] The very relation of “the First” to Him is the relation of “the Last,” “the Manifest,” and “the Hidden.”

It is not said that He is First through one relation and Last through another. For the possible thing is bound to the Necessary Existent, in its existence and nonexistence, by a bond of need for Him in its existence. If He brings it into existence, the possible thing remains in its possibility; if it is nonexistent, it does not depart from its possibility.

Just as, when the possible thing’s entity comes into existence after having been nonexistent, no attribute enters it that removes it from possibility, so no description enters the Creator, the Necessary Existent, through His bringing the world into existence that removes Him from the necessity of His existence through Himself. The Real is intelligible only in this manner, and the possible thing is intelligible only in this manner.^[31] If you understand, you know the meaning of temporal origination and the meaning of beginninglessness. After that, say what you wish.

(The World’s Firstness and Lastness, and the Divine Names)

The world’s firstness and lastness are relative matters, if it has a last. As for existence, it has a last in every individual instant, and (it has) an ending according to the people of unveiling. The Ḥusbāniyyah agree with them on this, just as the Ashʿarites agree with them that an accident does not remain for two instants. What is first in the world is first in relation to what is created after it; what is last in the world is last in relation to what was created before it.

The intelligibility of God’s being named the First, the Last, the Manifest, and the Hidden is not like this. For the world is multiple, while the Real is one and does not become multiple. It is not correct that He should be first in relation to us: His rank bears no proportion to ours, and our rank does not admit His firstness.